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Abstract—The participation of renewable, energy storage, and 
resources with limited fuel inventory in electricity markets has 
created the need for optimal scheduling and pricing across 
multiple market intervals for resources with intertemporal 
constraints. In this paper, a new multi-period market model is 
proposed to enhance the efficiency of markets with such type of 
resources. It is also the first market design that links a forward 
market and a spot market through the coordination of schedule 
and price under the multi-period paradigm, achieving reliability, 
economic efficiency and dispatch-following incentives 
simultaneously. The forward market solves a multi-period model 
with a long look-ahead time horizon whereas the spot market 
solves a series of multi-period dispatch and pricing problems with 
a shorter look-ahead time horizon on a rolling basis. By using the 
forward schedules and opportunity costs of intertemporal 
constraints as a guideline, the spot market model is able to produce 
economically efficient dispatch solutions as well as prices that 
incentivize dispatch following under the perfect forecast condition. 
The proposed scheme is applied to the dispatch and pricing of 
energy storage resources. Numerical experiments show that the 
proposed scheme outperforms the traditional myopic method in 
terms of economic efficiency, dispatch following and reliability.  
 
Index Terms—Multi-period scheduling and pricing, 
intertemporal constraint, energy storage, ramping 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
NTERTEMPROAL constraints are inherent to almost all the 
resources participating in electricity markets today. For 
instance, every generating unit has a ramp rate, which limits the 
output change within a certain period. Energy storage resources 
have limited storage capability, limiting the amount of charge 
and discharge in each operating cycle. Units such as oil, 
pipeline constrained gas-fired units and pondage hydro may 
have limited fuel inventories and/or emission limits, which 
prevent them from operating at their full capacity for the entire 
operating day.  
Intertemporal constraints couple the markets in different time 
intervals. The market outcome in one market interval may 
affect another. Under several recent industry trends in the U.S., 
such temporal market coupling has become tighter:  
 The “duck curve” load shape resulting from a large amount 
of PV installation [1] requires more ramping capacity from 
conventional units to cope with a deep midday drop in the 
net load. Consequently, market clearing are more 
frequently constrained by the intertemporal linkages 
among different market intervals, making it difficult for 
market participants to predict these coupling intervals and 
internalize the corresponding opportunity cost into their 
bids.    
 The states’ effort to pursue their renewable portfolio 
standards helps spur a large amount of energy storage 
resources (ESR) [2]–[4]. The emerging storage 
technologies, such as batteries and flywheels, are capable 
of running many charge/discharge cycles per day. 
However, the outcomes of self-managed ESRs may not be 
efficient and reliable due to the dynamics in the real-time 
market. An alternative would be ISO-managed ESRs, 
whose intertemporal constraints are explicitly modeled in 
the ISO scheduling and pricing processes.    
 As the nation increasingly relies on the natural-gas-fired 
units that are largely connected to the gas pipelines rather 
than having local gas storage, disruptions on the gas 
pipeline systems can have a significant impact on the 
reliable operation of the power system [5]. The value of the 
fuel storage becomes more prominent, and optimal 
scheduling of these resources across different market 
intervals is critical. 
The above industry trends highlight the implication of 
intertemporal linkages for optimal operation of power systems 
and call for careful studies of scheduling and pricing methods 
or market design for markets with intertemporal constraints.  
II.  PRIOR WORK AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
All the ISOs in the U.S. run a day-ahead (DAM) and real-
time market (RTM). The DAM, a forward market, typically 
contains 24 market periods. The schedules and prices for all the 
DAM periods are simultaneously produced by a 24-hour market 
clearing model, respecting intertemporal constraints. As a 
result, the DAM clearing prices reflect intertemporal 
opportunity cost, which is the opportunity cost a resource 
incurred due to the fact that the production in one period affects 
another via intertemporal linkages. On the other hand, the 
RTM, the spot market, is typically a single-period market, 
whose clearing prices may not reflect intertemporal opportunity 
costs. RT schedules are determined by optimizing either a 
single- or multi-period problem depending on the ISOs’ tariffs. 
The existing RTM scheduling and pricing models are reviewed 
in Subsection II.A. 
Under the existing market designs in the U.S., the 
coordination between the DAM and RTM is weak in terms of 
dispatch and pricing. The DAM schedules are not considered in 
the RTM scheduling process. By relying on the information 
only in a short RT time frame, the RTM schedules may impair 
reliability and efficiency, especially for inflexible generators, 
like oil or coal units, which require several hours to reach their 
full capacity as well as for storage hydro and limited energy 
resources, whose schedules need to be managed over the day. 
Furthermore, the existing RTM prices can be inconsistent with 
the DAM prices. For example, unlike the DAM prices derived 
from a 24-hour clearing model, the RTM price in a peak hour 
may not account for the intertemporal opportunity costs of 
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ramping up a unit out of merit in the previous hours to meet the 
peak demand. Such RTM price can discourage dispatch-
following incentives1 in the short term and undervalue flexible 
resources used to meet the peak load in the long term as pointed 
out in [6].2  
 Although there exists a large body of literature on the multi-
period scheduling models, there are few publications that 
examine the scheduling coordination between a forward market 
and the RTM, the linkage between forward market prices and 
RTM prices, as well as the impact of RTM pricing/settlement 
schemes on dispatch following incentives.  
A.  Prior work 
1) The myopic approach 
The myopic approach in the RTM solves a single-period 
economic dispatch problem that minimizes the cost of meeting 
load over a 5- or 10-minute period, without considering the cost 
or the system’s ability of meeting demand in future dispatch 
intervals. As a result, system operators may have to take manual 
actions to adjust dispatch solutions to accommodate expected 
future conditions. Such manual actions are subjective and can 
be suboptimal or even infeasible. In addition, market clearing 
prices generated based on a single-period model are often 
inconsistent with manual actions, creating disincentives for 
units to follow their dispatch instructions, and subsequently 
increasing the need for out-of-market payments.  
2) The multi-period approach 
Multi-period market clearing models have been drawing 
much attention because of their capability of optimizing the 
system with a set of intertemporal constraints across several 
time intervals. A few ISOs in the U.S. have implemented multi-
period dispatch in the RTM  [7]–[9].  
i) Challenges of existing multi-period scheduling models  
Various multi-period scheduling models have been 
extensively studied with the objectives of improving dispatch 
efficiency and reliability, e.g. [10]–[13], etc. However, when 
the market coupling involves many market intervals, the sizes 
of these models become too large to be solved quickly to 
provide solutions every five minutes in the RTM. In practice, in 
order to reduce the model size, the look-ahead horizon of these 
models is typically set at one hour, as in New York and 
Californian ISOs, and the time resolution is increased to reduce 
the number of dispatch periods in the multi-period scheduling 
model at the expense of operational efficiency and reliability.  
ii) Challenges of existing multi-period pricing models  
Current market designs do not have efficient pricing or 
settlement mechanisms for a resource to recover its 
intertemporal opportunity costs via market clearing prices. 
Consequently, resources are compelled to internalize their 
opportunity costs into bids and offers, but estimating 
opportunity costs is a challenging task as pointed out in [14]. 
Therefore, it is important to develop an efficient pricing scheme 
                                                          
1 A resource has dispatch-following incentives under a given clearing price if the resource’s profit would not be better off by not following the ISO’s dispatch 
instructions under the clearing price.  
2 Although unit commitment processes are run periodically in the RTM to commit additional units or pre-ramp resources for the reliability purpose, there are 
no market prices associated with these commitment and dispatch instructions. Therefore, the existing real-time unit commitment processes do not properly provide 
dispatch-following incentives.     
that properly reflects the impact of intertemporal constraints in 
the market clearing prices. The existing multi-period pricing 
work can be categorized into three types, namely the first-
period only settlement, the multi-settlement, and the prior-cost 
based pricing. These pricing approaches all focus on the RTM, 
but do not exploit the connection between the DAM and RTM. 
 Under the first-period only settlement, a multi-period 
pricing problem is run at each market clearing. Only the 
first period is settled, and the prices for the later periods are 
advisory and not financially binding [15]. This approach 
has been used in New York ISO [7] and California ISO [8]. 
Because opportunity costs embedded in the advisory 
intervals are never settled upon, as noted in [16], the market 
participants may have incentives to deviate from dispatch 
instructions, decreasing operational efficiency.  
 Unlike the first-period only settlement approach, all the 
periods are financially binding under the multi-settlement 
approach [17]. However, because the multi-settlement 
approach considers the past dispatch decisions irrelevant to 
price determination, the resulting prices do not necessarily 
accurately reflect the total cost of serving the load. 
Consequently, this approach can distort dispatch-following 
incentives in the short term as shown in [16], as well as fail 
to send right investment signals in the long run.        
 The prior-cost based pricing method in [18] and [19] 
incorporates the costs associated with the past dispatch 
decisions, and then determines prices by re-optimizing the 
social welfare for the entire look-ahead time horizon [18] 
or the remainder of the time horizon [19]. Only the first 
interval is settled. This approach is shown to alleviate the 
dispatch-following incentive issue in RT. However, if the 
RTM look-ahead time horizon is long, e.g. several hours or 
a day, the prior-cost based approach would be impractical 
because it is very computationally challenging to solve 
such large-scale problems in the RT operation.  
B.  Contributions 
To address the issue with the weak coordination between the 
forward market and RTM under the existing approaches, we 
propose a coupled multi-period market design that strengthens 
the coordination between these two markets. Under the 
proposed design, the forward market solves a multi-period 
problem with a long look-ahead horizon as the existing forward 
markets in the U.S. In the RTM, the RT prices are determined 
by solving linear programming problems with a shorter look-
ahead horizon. The RT pricing problems coordinate the RT 
prices with forward prices to better reflect intertemporal 
opportunity costs, and the resulting RT prices provide better 
dispatch-following incentives. In addition, a new RT 
scheduling problem is employed to take into account the 
schedules obtained in the forward market. It ensures efficient 
and reliable system operation under the perfect forecast 
condition as well as is computationally efficient for real-world 
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implementations. A multi-settlement system is adopted for 
settling each market clearing, reducing market participants’ risk 
exposure. The mechanism of this multi-settlement system is 
similar to the multi-settlement pricing approach proposed in 
[17]. However, unlike the multi-settlement pricing approach, 
the proposed clearing prices more accurately reflect the load 
serving costs, which in turn induce dispatch-following 
incentives.  
Although the proposed approach is seemingly comparable to 
bi-level or multi-stage stochastic models, it is fundamentally 
different. In bi-level approach [20]–[22], no pricing or 
scheduling mechanisms are offered while a three-stage 
stochastic model in [23] is used only for DAM clearing, but 
does not consider intertemporal coupling in RTM.  
The proposed pricing design can be distinguished from [19] 
from two perspectives. First, [19] investigates the RTM pricing 
model in isolation whereas the proposed design considers both 
forward market and RTM, leading to improvement in efficiency 
and reliability. Second, the proposed pricing design can be 
considered as an evolution of [19] for its flexibility to cover a 
spectrum of deployment time frames without sacrificing 
computational efficiency, economic efficiency and dispatch-
following incentives, making it more practical and general than 
[19].  
The specific contributions of this paper are the following: 
a. We develop a practical multi-period market clearing model 
for scheduling and pricing of electricity markets with 
intertemporal constraints. Under the proposed approach, the 
ISO is able to maintain operational reliability and market 
efficiency without sacrificing computational efficiency.    
b. This is the first paper that considers the coordination between 
a forward market and RTM in terms of scheduling and 
pricing under the multi-period paradigm. The incorporation 
of intertemporal opportunity costs in the RTM pricing 
scheme makes the RT prices more closely reflect the load 
serving cost, maintaining the pricing consistency between the 
forward prices and RT prices. It also reduces the need of 
participants incorporating the opportunity cost in their bids 
and offers. 
c. The proposed pricing scheme provides proper dispatch-
following incentives, and the proposed scheduling scheme 
produces economically efficient dispatch results under the 
perfect forecast conditions. Other properties of the proposed 
scheme are also studied under the imperfect forecast 
conditions. 
d. We apply the proposed scheme to a stylized small system 
with ESRs as well as real-world ISO New England (ISO NE) 
system. The advantages of the proposed scheme in terms of 
economic efficiency, reliability and dispatch-following 
incentives are demonstrated in the numerical studies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The proposed 
coordinated market clearing model as well as its properties are 
                                                          
3 We focus on linear programming problems in this paper. The integer decisions and other non-convex constraints are not considered because these features 
are closely related to the non-convexity pricing issue, which is not the focus of this paper. In the presence of the non-convexities, there may be no set of prices 
that supports the dispatch to achieve a competitive partial equilibrium. In the current practice, one solution to make the dispatch consistent with the incentives in 
the market is to make up any losses for dispatched resources via the uplift payments. In addition, some ISOs have modified the traditional marginal pricing scheme 
to incorporate non-convex costs such as start-up and no-load costs into prices and redefined uplift payments. Although the proposed pricing scheme addresses the 
issues associated with intertemporal constraints, it can be incorporated into the existing practice of dealing with non-convexities. 
presented in Section III. The numerical studies are described in 
Section IV. The paper is concluded in Section V.  
III.  THE PROPOSED COORDINATED MULTI-PERIOD MARKET 
CLEARING FRAMEWORK 
Under the proposed scheme, the forward market takes place 
at 0t  as illustrated in Fig. 1. A multi-period model is solved to 
meet the forecasted system condition at the entire planning time 
horizon, and simultaneously generates the forward clearing 
quantities and prices for each time period. It also obtains 
intertemporal opportunity costs for each resource under the 
forecasted system condition.  
The RTM has a shorter look-ahead time horizon, which is 
called sub time horizon, and clears on a rolling basis. Each 
market clearing results in a set of cleared quantities together 
with a set of corresponding prices. The cleared quantities and 
prices are settled after each market clearing under a multi-
settlement system. The shorter time horizon in the RTM is able 
to reduce computational burden as well as simplify the 
settlement process. In order to compensate the narrower vision 
of the RT market clearing, the forward schedules are utilized to 
guide the RT scheduling model. The intertemporal opportunity 
costs are incorporated into the RT pricing model to maintain the 
consistency of prices between the forward market and RTM, 
providing much needed dispatch-following incentives.  
 Even though the forecast in the forward market may not be 
perfect, it can still be argued that the forward solution is the best 
possible solution given system operators’ beliefs. The RT 
scheduling and pricing problems are designed to follow the 
forward scheduling and price trajectories, and at the same time 
it is left with the freedom to adjust schedules and prices the best 
way it can in the sub time horizon given the newly revealed 
information.   
   
Figure 1: The proposed multi-period market clearing framework 
A.  The forward market  
    1)  The forward market clearing model 
The forward multi-period market clearing model can be cast 
as the following linear programming problem3:  
Forward market
market clearing at t0
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1 ,...,
min
Tx x
t t
t
c x

 T
T
 (1) 
s.t. 1t t t t tB Ax x b     tT , 1:( )t t   (2) 
 t t tG x g   tT , ( )t  (3) 
 t t tF x f   tT , ( )t  (4) 
The objective of the multi-period problem (1) is to minimize the 
overall production cost across the entire time horizon 
{1,..., }t T T . Constraint (2) represents the intertemporal 
constraints. Constraint (3) is the system-level time-independent 
constraint, representing the energy balance, reserve 
requirement and transmission constraints. Constraint (4) 
represents time-independent constraints at the individual 
resource level, e.g. resources’ operational capacity.  
We use the superscript u  to denote the optimal primal and 
dual solutions to the forward problem (1)-(4):  
1{ ,...: , }T
u u ux xx   and  ,: ( , )
u u u u    . The forward 
clearing quantity is 
ux , and the market clearing price is  
: t
uu
t tLMP G 
T
 for  tT . 
    2)  Properties of the forward market clearing model 
In this subsection, we discuss the properties of the forward 
market clearing results. Consider the profit maximization 
problem of a price-taking resource i  under the clearing price 
uLMP : 
  
, ,max ( )
i
t
u
i t
t
i
x
tc xLMP


T
  (5) 
s.t.
 , , 1 , , ,i t i t i t i t i tB xAx b    tT , , 1:( )i t t   (6) 
 
, , ,i t i t i tF fx    tT , ,( )i t  (7) 
Based on the definition in [24], the clearing quantity 
ux  and 
price 
uLMP  constitute a competitive equilibrium if a) for each 
resource i , u
ix  solves the profit maximization problem (5)-(7), 
and b) supply and demand are balanced. Property 1 indicates 
that the forward clearing results achieve a competitive 
equilibrium.  
Property 1: Assuming that all the resources bid  truthfully, the 
forward clearing  quantity 
ux  and price uLMP  constitute a 
competitive equilibrium. 
Property 1 can be easily proved by matching the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the upper-level overall 
problem (1)-(4) with the KKT conditions of each individual 
profit maximization problem (5)-(7) as well as the market 
clearing condition (3). We omit the details here.  
Next, consider the Lagrangian function of the profit 
maximization problem (5)-(7): 
, ,
, 1: , , 1 , , ,
, , , ,
( )
( , , ) ( )
( )
u
i t i t
i i i i i t t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
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P
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f
x b  

 
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  
 
   
 
   
 T
T
T
 (8) 
It is easy to show that the forward dual solution (
u
i ,
u
i ) is 
the Lagrangian multipliers for (8). Therefore, by the first-order 
condition, we have 
, , ,, 1: , : 11 , , 0
u u
i t i t i
u u
t i t t i itt t i ttc A FLMP B        
T T T  (9) 
If 
,
u
i t  is zero, it means that resource i’s output is between its 
minimum and maximum capacities. Thus, the resource is a 
marginal resource. As a result, equation (9) can be written as 
follows: 
, 1: , 1 : 1, , ,
u u
t i t t i t
u
i t t ti t iLMP c A B    
T T . (10)
 
Notice that 
u
tLMP  and ,i tc  are no longer equal to each other 
in the time period t  as is expected for a marginal resource in a 
single-period problem. This is because the cost 
,i tc  is not the 
true marginal cost – it is only the marginal production cost, e.g. 
the fuel cost. The true marginal cost is the right hand side of 
(10), including the marginal production cost 
,i tc  as well as the 
intertemporal opportunity cost 
, : 1 ,, 1 , 1:
u
i t i t
u
i t t i t tB A   
T T .  
In particular, the intertemporal opportunity cost in the time 
period t  is a resource’s overall foregone profit if it chooses one 
more unit production in t , which in turn affects the production 
in other time periods due to intertemporal constraints. The 
marginal profit in the time period t  is the additional profit in 
the time period t  of choosing one more unit of production in 
that time period. The marginal profit can be either positive 
(marginal gain) or negative (marginal loss). Equation (10) 
implies the following property.  
Property 2: Assuming a resource is marginal in the time period 
t , the marginal profit 
,
u
it tL P cM   compensates the 
intertemporal opportunity cost  for 
this resource.  
Proof: The marginal profit in the time period t  is 
,
u
it tL P cM   
for resource i  by the definition. In addition, because u
i  is the 
Lagrangian multiplier for the profit maximization problem (5)-
(7) based on Property 1, it follows by sensitivity analysis in [25] 
that the overall profit change, i.e. the objective value change in 
(5), would be  if  resource i   were 
allowed to provide one additional unit from ,
u
i tx  at time period 
t . Hence,  represents the 
intertemporal opportunity cost. Together with equation (10), it 
implies that the marginal profit of the time period t  equals the 
intertemporal opportunity cost. Q.E.D. 
 
B.  The RTM  
    1)  The RTM clearing model 
The RTM is a rolling-horizon market. Each RT market 
clearing looks ahead a shorter time horizon rather than the full 
horizon of the operating day. We use the subscript s  to denote 
a RTM sub time horizon 
0 *{ ,..., }s st tS  starting at 
0
st  and 
, : 1 ,, 1 , 1:
u
i t i t
u
i t t i t tB A   
T T
, : 1 ,, 1 , 1:
u
i t i t
u
i t t i t tB A   
T T
, : 1 ,, 1 , 1:
u
i t i t
u
i t t i t tB A   
T T
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ending at 
*
st . The subscript 's  denotes the past time horizon
0{1,..., 1}st S' , and the subscript ''s   denotes the future 
time horizon *{ 1,.. , }.st TS'' . Without loss of generality, it 
is assumed that the parameter g  is uncertain. The realized 
uncertainty in the past is denoted by 
*
'sg ; new information is 
revealed for the current sub time horizon, resulting in a new 
forecast ˆ
sg ; and the future forecast is assumed to remain 
unchanged as sg  . 
Different from the forward market clearing, the RTM 
clearing involves two processes, namely, a scheduling process, 
where the market clearing quantity is determined to maximize 
the social welfare in the sub time horizon, and a pricing process, 
where the market clearing price is determined for each time 
period in the sub time horizon.  
The proposed RT scheduling problem at the sub time horizon 
S  is defined by (11), using the realized dispatch  0 1
*
st
x

 and 
the forward schedule * 1st
ux

 of the subsequent time period as the 
boundary conditions: 
0 *
*
1 1
( ) : min,
s s s
s s s
u
tt x
x xSP xc
 
 T  
(11) 
0 0 0 0 0
*
1
s.t. 
s s s s st t t t t
xB A x b

  
       1t t t t tB Ax x b   ,  
0 *1,...,s st t t   
       * * * * *1 1 1 1s s s s st t t
u
t t
x x bB A
   
  
       ˆs s sG x g  
       s s sF x f  
Since the forecast for the future time periods S''  is assumed to 
remain unchanged, * 1st
ux

can be considered as the best available 
dispatch plan in the time period 
* 1st    that leads to the optimal 
schedule in the future S'' . The optimal solution *
sx  to sSP  
can be thought of as an optimal outcome in the current sub time 
horizon given the past and future boundary conditions.   
The proposed RT pricing problem is defined as follows:  
0 0 0 0 0 0* * * * * *
, ,
1: : 1 1: : 1 1
( , ) : min
s s s s s s s ss s s s s
u u u u
s s s tt t tt t t t t t tx t
PP c x A B xx   
    
  T T T  
*  ˆ.t. ( )s s s s sgG x   
(12) 
         s s sF x f  
        1t t t t tB Ax x b   , 
0 *1,...,s st t t   
where the offer adjustments 0 0 01:s s st
u
t t
A 

 T  and * * *1 : 1s s s
u
t t t
B 
 
 T  are 
obtained from the shadow prices of the intertemporal 
constraints in the forward market. The market clearing price 
LMP in the current sub time horizon S  can be constructed 
from the shadow prices of the system level constraint in 
problem (12) as follows: 
* *
ss sLMP G 
T  (13) 
    2)  Properties of the RTM under the perfect forecast 
In this subsection, we discuss the properties of the RTM 
clearing results if the forecast is accurate.  
Property 3: Under the perfect forecast condition, the RT 
clearing quantities are identical to the forward clearing 
quantities.  
Proof: We prove it by contradiction. Suppose that the forward 
schedule 
u
sx  is a feasible but not an optimal solution to the RT 
scheduling problem sSP . Then, there exists a feasible solution 
( )ussx x  to sSP  such that 
u
s s s sxc c x
T T
. Under the perfect 
forecast assumption, the dispatch solution 
' ''( , , )
u u
s s sx x x  is a 
feasible solution to the forward problem (1)-(4), and   
' ' '' '' ' ' '' ''
u u u u u
s s s s s s s s s s s sx x xc c c c c cx x x    
T T T T T T
, 
which contradicts the fact that 
' ''( , , )
u u u
s s sx x x  is the optimal 
solution to the forward problem (1)-(4). Therefore, 
u
sx  is an 
optimal solution to sSP .  
Now we prove the converse. Suppose that the RT schedule 
*
sx  is a part of a feasible not optimal solution to the forward 
problem (1)-(4). Then, it implies that the feasible forward 
solution 
*
' ''( , , )
u u
s s sx x x  satisfies the following inequality: 
*
' ' '' '' ' ' '' ''
u u u u u
s s s s s s s s s s s sx xc c x x xc c c c x    
T T T T T T
,  
or equivalently, 
*
' '
u
s s s sc cx x
T T
, which contradicts the fact that 
*
sx  is the optimal solution to sSP . Q.E.D. 
Remark: Property 3 indicates that the RT clearing quantities are 
an optimal solution to the overall multi-period problem even 
though the RTM optimizes over a sub time horizon rather than 
the entire time horizon.  
Property 4: Under the assumption that the forecast for the 
future time horizon is accurate, the RT clearing quantity of the 
current sub time horizon ensures the reliability needs for the 
future time horizon.   
Proof: If the forecast for the future time horizon S''  is 
accurate, then the forward schedule 
''
u
sx  must be a feasible 
dispatch solution in the future time horizon. By setting one of 
the boundary conditions of the RT scheduling problem at the 
forward clearing quantity * 1st
ux

, it can ensure that the schedule 
in the current sub time horizon, 
*
sx , is able to transition to the 
schedule in the following time period, * 1st
ux

. Hence, the RT 
schedule 
*
sx  guarantees a reliable future solution ''
u
sx . Q.E.D. 
Property 5: Under the perfect forecast condition, the RT 
clearing prices are identical to the forward clearing prices, and 
induce dispatch-following incentives.  
Proof: We first show the consistency between the forward and 
RT clearing prices. The forward clearing price 
: t
uu
t tLMP G 
T
, 1,...,t T  is an optimal solution to the 
following forward dual problem: 
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 1:
( ), , 0
max t t t t t t t
t
b g f
  
  


  T T T
T
 (14) 
s.t. 
1: 1 : 1t t t t t t t t t t tA B G F c        
T T T T  (15) 
1,..., 1t T    
 
1:T T T T T T T TA G F c     
T T T  (16) 
Under the perfect forecast condition, the RT clearing prices 
* *:s s sLMP G 
T
 in the sub time horizon S  can be obtained 
by solving the following dual problem of sPP , which uses the 
forward dual solution 0 01:s s
u
t t


 and * *: 1s s
u
t t


 as the boundary 
conditions: 
 
*
0
0 0 0 0
1:
, ,
1
( ) 0
max
             
s
s s s
s
s s s s
t t t t
t
t t
t t
t t
t
t t
b g f
g f
  
  
 
 


 
 
 T T T
T T
 (17) 
s.t. 
1: 1 : 1t t t t t t t t t t tA B G F c        
T T T T  (18) 
  0 *1,..., 1s st t t     
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 : 11:s s s s s s s s s s s
u
t t t t t t t t t t t
A B G F c   
  
   T T T T  (19) 
* * * * * * * * * * *1: : 11s s s s s s s s s s s
u
t t t t t t t t t t t
A B G F c   
  
   T T T T  (20) 
Similar to the contradiction proof used in Property 3, the 
equivalence between 
*
s  and 
u
s  can be obtained by showing 
that 
*
s  must be the optimal solution to the forward dual 
problem (14)-(16), and 
u
s  is also the optimal solution to the 
RT pricing dual problem (17)-(20). The details are omitted here 
to avoid repetitiveness. As a result, it implies that the forward 
clearing price 
u
sLMP  is the same as 
*
sLMP  in the sub time 
horizon.  
 Furthermore, because of the equivalency between the 
forward and RT clearing prices as well as quantities, it is easy 
to show that the solution to the resource profit maximization 
problem (5)-(7)  matches the solution to the scheduling problem 
sSP . This implies that each resource in the RTM has incentive 
to follow the schedule path determined in the forward market. 
Q.E.D. 
Remark: The offer adjustments 0 0 01:s s st
u
t t
A 

 T  and * * *1 : 1s s s
u
t t t
B 
 
 T  
can be considered as the boundary conditions for the pricing 
problem sPP . Under such boundary conditions, the ISO is able 
to reproduce the full multi-period prices by solving the pricing 
problem in a shorter time horizon under the perfect forecast 
condition.  
    3)  Impact of uncertainty on the opportunity cost estimation 
and system feasibility 
When the forecast of the uncertain parameter g  is imperfect, 
the properties in the previous subsection do not necessarily 
hold. To obtain the actual intertemporal opportunity costs, the 
ISO would have to frequently re-optimize the multi-period 
problem with the updated parameter g  in the RTM, which is 
impractical and computationally challenging for a large system. 
In practice, if the realization of the parameter g  does not 
deviate significantly from the forecasted value, the offer 
adjustments 0 0 01:s s st
u
t t
A 

 T  and * * *1 : 1s s s
u
t t t
B 
 
 T  can be considered 
as the estimations of the intertemporal opportunity costs as 
indicated in Property 6 below. If the realization deviates 
significantly from the forecast value, then the estimations 
become inaccurate, re-optimization should be performed.  
Before presenting Property 6, we introduce two terms. The 
backward-looking intertemporal opportunity cost is how much 
the overall profit of all the resources in the past would have 
changed if every resource is allowed to deviate its production at 
the start of current look-ahead time horizon by one more unit. 
The forward-looking intertemporal opportunity cost is the 
overall profit change in the future if every resource is allowed 
to deviate its production at the end of current look-ahead time 
horizon by one more unit. Opportunity cost is typically forward 
looking in that it measures the value that a resource sacrifices 
at the time the decision is made and beyond. We want to provide 
justifications for the backward-looking intertemporal 
opportunity cost here. At any moment in time, a resource can 
look either forward or backward. One looks backward in time 
in a perspective of the alternative of leaving the market. One 
looks forward in time in a perspective of the alternative 
decisions to be made and the consequences of each. The goal of 
the market is to incentivize resources to follow the scheduling 
path for the entire time horizon desired by the ISO. This means 
that the ISO needs to keep track of the impact of the dispatch 
made in the past on the present choice. Otherwise, resources 
would wish they could renege on their previous dispatch 
actions. By incorporating both the backward-looking and 
forward-looking intertemporal opportunity costs in the RT 
pricing model, resources have incentives to follow the entire 
scheduling path desired by the ISO.    
Property 6: The offer adjustments 0 0 01:s s st
u
t t
A 

 T  and 
* * *1 : 1s s s
u
t t t
B 
 
 T  are approximations of the backward-looking and 
forward-looking intertemporal opportunity costs, respectively.  
Proof: If every resource were able to re-optimize in the past 
time horizon S'  given that the schedule at the boundary time 
period 
0
st  is set to be 0, si t
x , then it would solve the following 
profit maximization problem 0,
( )
s
i i t
xU , which is 
parameterized by 0, si t
x : 
0,
( ) :
si t
iU x   
, '
*
' , ' , 'max
i s
s i s i s
x
cLMP x
T
  (21) 
s.t. 
, , 1 , , ,i t i t i t i t i tB xAx b  , 
01,..., st t  (22) 
   *, ' , ' ,i s i s i sx gG  , , ' , ' , 'i s i s i sx fF   (23) 
The overall profit of all the resources in the past time horizon is 
0
'
*
, ' , ' ' , ',
( ) max
s s
i i s ii ti x
i i
s s i sU x Lx Pc M x    T , 
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which is equivalent to the following production cost 
minimization problem in the past time horizon given the fact 
that supply and demand are balanced, i.e. 
, '
i
i sx = 0: 
0
ˆ ( ) :
st
xU 
'
' 'min
s
s s
x
c xT   (24) 
s.t. 
1t t t t tB Ax x b   , 
01,..., st t  (25) 
 
 
*
' ' ' ' '
,
s s s s s s
G x F xg f   (26) 
It follows by the definition that the backward-looking 
intertemporal opportunity cost is equal to the subgradient4 of 
the function ∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝑠0)𝑖 , which is not necessarily 
differentiable. Because ∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝑠0)𝑖 = ?̂?(𝑥𝑡𝑠0), we have the 
backward-looking intertemporal opportunity cost is equivalent 
to the subgradient of  ?̂?(𝑥𝑡𝑠0), i.e. 0
ˆ ( )
st
xU .  
        It is trivial to show that the forward optimal dual solution  
( 0 00:1 1:
,..., , ,
s s
u
t
u
t
u u
s s      ) is dual feasible to 0
ˆ ( )
st
U x . By 
Proposition 2.1 in [26], the linear function   
  0 00 00 ,'' ' ' '' 1' :( ) :s s s s s
u
s s st t t
u u u
s s t ts s
D b g f A xx    

   T *,T T T  (27) 
is a lower cut for 
0
ˆ ( )
st
U x  at 0
s
u
t
x , i.e. for every 0
st
x , we have 
0 0'
ˆ ( ) ( )
s st
st
U Dx x  and the distance between the values of 
0
ˆ ( )
st
U x   and of the cut 0' ( )
s
s t
xD  at 0
s
u
t
x   is at most  , where 
0 0'
ˆ ( ) ( )
s s
s
u
t
u
t
x xU D  . Thus,  
0 0 00 00 001:
,ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )
s s s s s s s s
u u u
t tt t t t tt
U Ux x x xA x

   T , 
which implies that 0 0 0 0:
,
1s s s s
u
t t tt
A x

 T  is an -subergradient5 of  
0
ˆ ( )
st
U x  at 0
s
u
t
x . This means that 0 0 01:s s st
u
t t
A 

 T  is an 
approximation of 
0
ˆ ( )
st
xU . In other words, 0 0 01:s s st
u
t t
A 

 T  is an 
approximation of the backward-looking intertemporal 
opportunity cost. 
The optimal future profit for each resource can be defined by 
*,
( )
s
i i t
xV , which is parameterized by *, si t
x : 
*,
( ) :
si t
iV x   
, "
*
" " , "
max
i s
s
x
s i s
cLMP x
T
  (28) 
s.t. 
, , 1 , , ,i t i t i t i t i tB xAx b  , 
* 1,...,st t T   
(29) 
   
*
, " , " , "i s i s i sgG x  , , " , " , "i s i s i sx fF   (30) 
Similarly, the overall profit of all the resources in the 
future time horizon is *,( )si tii
V x , which is equivalent to the 
                                                          
4  If the function ∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝑠0)𝑖  is differentiable, then the backward-looking intertemporal opportunity cost is equal to the derivative of the function ∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝑠0)𝑖  
by its definition. However, the function ∑ 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑡𝑠0)𝑖  is not necessarily differentiable, then the subgradient, which is a generalization of the derivative of a function, 
represents the backward-looking intertemporal opportunity cost. The vector 𝑣 is a subgradient of a function 𝑓 at 𝑥 if 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑣𝑇(𝑦 − 𝑥) ≤ 𝑓(𝑦) for all 𝑦. The set 
of all subgradients can be written as 𝜕𝑓(𝑥).    
5 A vector 𝜔 is a -subgradient of a convex function 𝑓 at the point 𝑥 if for every 𝑦, it satisfies the following inequality: 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝜔𝑇(𝑦 − 𝑥) − 𝜖 ≤ 𝑓(𝑦).  . 
following production cost minimization problem in the future 
time horizon: 
*
ˆ( ) :
st
xV 
"
" "min
s
s s
x
c xT   (31) 
s.t. 
1t t t t t
B bAx x

  , * 1,...,st t T   (32) 
 
" " "
*
" " ", s s ss s s F x fG x g   (33) 
It follows by definition that the forward-looking intertemporal 
opportunity cost is equal to 
*
ˆ( )
st
xV . Similar to the proof of the 
first half of the property, it can be shown that * * *1 : 1s s s
u
t t t
B 
 
 T  is 
an approximation of  
*
ˆ( )
st
xV . Q.E.D. 
Remark: Property 6 suggests that the offer adjustments 
* * * *
,
: 1 1s s s s
u
t t t t
B x
 
 T  and 0 0 0 0:
,
1s s s s
u
t t tt
A x

 T  supplements the RT 
pricing problem with the information associated with the past 
and future time periods so that the pricing problem does not 
need to include the detailed constraints related to the past and 
future.    
Next, let us focus on the RT schedules. If the updated forecast 
ˆ
sg  in the current sub time horizon is significantly different 
from the forward forecast, then the RT scheduling problem 
sSP  may not be feasible under the given boundary conditions. 
Similarly, if the forecasts for the future time horizon deviate 
significantly from the ones in the forward market, then the 
forward schedule for the remaining time horizon may not serve 
as a reliable guideline for the RT processes and needs to be 
adjusted. One possible approach is to  re-optimize  the 
remaining time horizon S S''  based on the latest 
information. The adjusted schedules and intertemporal 
opportunity costs would be used as the new guideline for the 
scheduling and pricing processes in the remainder of the time 
horizon.   
C.  The multi-settlement system 
In general, a multi-settlement system is the settlement of a 
sequence of markets for a product that includes at least one 
forward market. In the forward market, buyers and sellers may 
conclude financial contracts for later delivery in a RTM, which 
involves the actual delivery of the product.  
Under the proposed framework, the clearing quantity of each 
time period t  at the forward market is settled at the 
corresponding price: u u
t tLMP x . In a RTM with a sub time 
horizon S , the deviation from the previous market clearing 
quantity, pre
tx , is settled at the RT clearing price, i.e. 
 * *( ) ( ) pret s t s tx xLMP  , for ( )t s S . The previous market 
can be either the forward market or the RTM preceding the 
current sub time horizon S .      
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A benefit of the multi-settlement system is that it reduces risk 
exposure for market participants. The forward schedule is 
financially binding. The RT price is used only to settle the 
deviation from the previous market clearing. By locking in the 
forward clearing prices, market participants are only exposed to 
the RT price volatility for the deviation quantity. 
IV.  NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS 
In the numerical experiments, we first consider a simple one-
node system with an ESR to illustrate the proposed market 
clearing process and the benefits of coordinating the DAM and 
RTM. Next, we use the real-world ISO NE system to compare 
the proposed design with other existing approaches in terms of 
computational efficiency, economic efficiency, load-following 
invectives and reliability.  
Case A: One-node system under the perfect as well as 
imperfect forecast 
In the one-node system, three conventional generators and an 
ESR are dispatched to serve the load. The characteristics of 
each generator and the ESR are summarized in Table 1. The 
charging/discharging efficiency of the ESR is assumed to be 1 
for the sake of simplicity. The ESR can seamlessly go from 
charging to discharging.  
 Gen1  Gen2 Gen3 ESR 
Offer Price ($/MWh) 10 63 100 9 
Bid Price ($/MWh) - - - 5 
EcoMax (MW) 40 40 30 15 
EcoMin (MW) 0 0 0 -15 
Max SOC (MWh) - - - 12 
Initial SOC (MWh) - - - 6 
Table 1: The characteristics of the resources 
The full time horizon consists of 8 time periods. The 
proposed market design is applied under two conditions, one 
assuming the perfect forecast and the other assuming the 
imperfect forecast. The realized RT load under these two 
conditions is summarized in Table 2. Under the perfect forecast, 
the RT realized load is the same as the forecast value used in 
the forward market. There are two peak loads occurring at t5 
and t8. 
Time RT load (MW) 
Perfect forecast Imperfect forecast  
𝑡1  24 25.8 
𝑡2  46 42.9 
𝑡3  70 64.0 
𝑡4  83 83.0 
𝑡5  98 91.6 
𝑡6  60 56.3 
𝑡7  77 72.8 
𝑡8  102 111.1 
Table 2: The realized load under the perfect and imperfect forecasts 
  Figure 2 summarizes the clearing prices as well as ESR 
clearing quantities in the forward and RT markets under the 
perfect forecast condition. The coordinated scheduling process 
is shown at the left side of Figure 2. In the forward market, the 
ESR is scheduled to charge to its max state-of-charge (SOC) 
capacity at t1, and remains idle until the first peak load at t5, 
when it is scheduled to fully discharged. Then, the ESR is 
charged at t6 and t7, when the load is low. Finally, the ESR is 
fully discharged at the last time period since any remaining 
SOC would be worthless afterwards. In the RTM, a sub time 
horizon contains three time periods, and the actual load is the 
same as the forecast load under the perfect forecast condition. 
Each RT scheduling problem utilizes the forward schedules to 
guide the dispatch. The resulting schedule in each RT 
scheduling problem matches the corresponding forward 
schedule, as claimed in Property 3.  
The right side of Figure 2. illustrates the coordinated pricing 
processes. The forward clearing prices and shadow prices of the 
SOC constraints are obtained by using the dual optimal 
solutions of the forward scheduling problem. In the RTM, each 
RT pricing problem takes into account the shadow prices of the 
SOC constraints or the intertemporal opportunity cost of the 
ESR. The resulting RT clearing prices are consistent with the 
forward prices, as proved in Property 5. 
  
Figure 2: The ESR schedules and clearing prices under the perfect 
forecast 
Under the imperfect forecast condition, the RT market 
clearing results for the ESR are shown in Figure 3. Because the 
RT load deviates from the forecast, the RT schedule of ESR is 
different from the forward schedule at t4 and t5 to account for 
the forecast errors. In other RT time intervals, the schedules of 
the conventional generators, which is not shown in Figure 3, are 
adjusted from their forward schedules to meet the actual load. 
Although the load forecast is not perfect, the resulting RTM 
clearing prices are identical to the forward clearing prices in this 
case as shown in Figure 3. In general, the RTM clearing prices 
are not necessarily equal to the forward prices in the presence 
of uncertainties.   
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the RT schedules and 
prices under the proposed approach, we compare them with the 
outcomes under the “perfect information”, which assumes that 
the realized RT load is known to the ISO. The multi-period 
market clearing model used in the forward market is run with 
the actual realized RT load to obtain the perfect schedules and 
prices, which are presented in Figure 3. It can be observed that 
the RT schedules and RT clearing prices of the ESR are 
consistent with the outcomes under the “perfect information”. 
The consistency results are also observed for the conventional 
generators. This implies that the proposed approach results in 
economic efficient schedules, and all resources have incentives 
to follow dispatch instructions in this case. 
By comparing the forward and perfect schedules in Figure 3, 
it can be observed that they are very similar. This means that 
the forward schedules serve as a reliable guideline for the RT 
10 63 63 100 63100 63 100
100
10 63 63
63 100 100
63 63 100
100 100 63
100 63 63
63 63 100
63 100
-6 0 0 0 -912 -3 12
12
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0 0 12
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dispatches, which contributes to the efficient RT schedules. 
Similarly, the forward shadow prices of the SOC constraints are 
identical to the ones under the “perfect information” as shown 
in Figure 3. This suggests that the forward market accurately 
captures the intertemporal opportunity cost in this test case, 
which helps the convergence between the RTM clearing prices 
and the perfect prices.       
 
Figure 3: The ESR schedules and clearing prices under the imperfect 
forecast 
Case B: ISO NE system under the imperfect forecast 
In this case, we study the following five approaches: 1) the 
myopic approach, 2) the first-period only settlement approach 
[15] with a rolling 2-period RTM, which is denoted by “first 
only” for short, 3) the proposed approach with rolling 2-period 
RTM, 4) Hogan’s approach [18] and 5) Hua’s approach [19] on 
the real-world ISO NE system. The myopic approach is 
considered as a baseline for comparing the performance of other 
alternative approaches. In this study, pumped-storage units with 
a total of 2000 MW capacity participate in the market. Each 
pumped-storage unit needs to meet an end-of-day target SOC. 
Generators are also constrained by their ramping capabilities.     
Under each approach, we perform the scheduling and pricing 
runs to meet 25 randomly realized load scenarios, which 
uniformly deviate 10% above the forecasted load.  We compare 
the alternative approaches in the following aspects: 
(a) Social surplus (SS): SS is a measurement of economic 
efficiency of a scheduling scheme. The larger SS is, the more 
economically efficient a dispatch scheme is. SS equals the sum 
of the conventional generators’ producer surplus (PS), 
consumer surplus (CS) and ESR surplus (ESRS).  
 (b)  Computation time: In practice, the pricing and 
scheduling models are typically run every 5 minutes in the 
RTM. Therefore, it is very important that the models must be 
solved efficiently for a large-scale system in the RTM 
application.  
 (c) The number of instances of constraint violation: a 
measure of reliability of a scheduling scheme. The number of 
instances of constraint violation are the total number of market 
intervals when supply and demand is not balanced, or the end-
of-day SOC target is not met. The larger the number is, the less 
reliable the system is under the corresponding dispatch scheme.        
(d) Lost opportunity cost (LOC): a measure of dispatch-
following incentives. It is the difference between the maximum 
possible profit a resource can make and the actual profit 
obtained by following the ISO’s dispatch instruction under the 
given LMPs. In particular, LOC is defined as follows: 
LOC = , ,
{(6),(7)}
max ( )
i
t i t i t
x
t
LMP c x



T
- ,
*
,( )t i t i t
t
LMP c x


T
 
If the LOC of a resource is equal to zero, it means that the 
market clearing scheme provides the best dispatch-following 
incentives. On the other hand, a large LOC implies that the 
LMP is either too high (or too low), which might lead to the 
resource generating more (or less) than the dispatch 
instructions.   
Table 3 compares five approaches in terms of the averages of 
ESRS, CS, PS and SS. Among all the approaches, the myopic 
approach benefits the conventional producers most at the 
expenses of consumer surplus and ESR surplus. Since the same 
scheduling problem is used under Hua’s and Hogan’s 
approaches, they result in the same SS. These two approaches 
outperform all the other approaches in terms of economic 
efficiency. Under the proposed approach, although the SS is not 
as high as the Hogan and Hua’s approaches, it improves ESRS 
drastically. Furthermore, SS under the proposed approach is 
higher than the myopic approach. This implies the dispatch 
solutions obtained by the proposed approach are more 
economically efficient than the myopic solutions.   
 ESRS CS PS SS 
Myopic 
(Million $) 
0.031 2,220 26 2,246 
First only +87.5% +0.7% -3.6% +0.7% 
Proposed +119.0% +1.4% -0.7% +1.4% 
Hua +40.4% +6.1% -31.4% +5.6% 
Hogan +40.4% +6.1% -31.4% +5.6% 
Table 3: Comparison of the average surpluses  
Table 4 reports the average and maximum CPU time for the 
RTM pricing and scheduling problems. The pricing and 
scheduling models were modeled in GAMS version 25.02 using 
CPLEX version 12.8.0.0. All tests were performed on a 2.6-
GHz Intel Core i7-6600U CPU with 16 GB RAM, running 64-
bit Windows. The wall-clock time limit for CPLEX is set to be 
5 minute to reflect RT market clearing on a 5-minute basis. The 
computation performance of the proposed approach is similar 
to the first-period only settlement approach. Both are practical 
for RT implementation.  The myopic approach is the most 
computationally efficient, but it is not as economically efficient 
compared to the other approaches as shown in Table 3. On the 
other hand, Hua and Hogan’s approaches are significantly 
slower than the other approaches. Under Hua’s approach, the 
maximum CPU time of the pricing problem is 205.1 seconds, 
more than 3 minutes. Under Hogan’s approach, 49 pricing 
problems exceed the CPLEX 5-minute time limit among 600 
pricing problems in the simulations. This implies that Hua and 
Hogan’s approaches are impractical for the real-time 
application.  
 Pricing problem Scheduling problem 
average max average max 
Myopic 1.9 2.7 1.9 2.7 
First only  3.8 5.3 3.8 5.3 
Proposed 3.8 5.4 3.9 5.5 
Hua 89.9 205.1 52.2 197.8 
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 10 
Hogan 154.9 300 52.2 197.8 
Table 4: Comparison of the average CPU time (seconds) 
Next, we compare the approaches in terms of reliability. 
Although supply and demand are balanced in all hours under 
the myopic and first-period only settlement approaches, 
pumped-storage resources are unable to meet the end-of-the-
day SOC target in all the scenarios under these approaches. This 
indicates a major reliability disadvantage of these two 
approaches due to ignoring the reliability needs for future 
market intervals or short look-ahead horizon. On the other hand, 
the system is reliable in all the scenarios under all the other 
approaches.  
Table 5 summarizes the mean of LOC under the five 
approaches. Hua’s approach results in the least total LOC 
whereas the myopic approach leads to the highest total LOC. 
Although dispatch-following incentive under the proposed 
approach is not as strong as compared to Hua’s approach, it is 
a significant improvement of the myopic approach and the first-
period only settlement approach. The reduction of the total 
LOC under Hogan’s approach is not as promising as the other 
approaches. This is because several pricing problems under 
Hogan’s approach are not solved to the optimality under the 
CPLEX time limit as mentioned earlier, the suboptimal prices 
provide weak dispatch-following incentives.  
 ESR Gen Consumer Total 
Myopic $84,167 $11,940 $1,260 $97,368 
First only  -65% -85% +3% -67% 
Proposed -98% -37% -13% -90% 
Hua -98% -93% -31% -96% 
Hogan -99% +212% +209% -57% 
Table 5: Comparison of mean of LOC 
To understand the impact of the length of the real-time look-
ahead horizon under the proposed approach, we vary the look-
ahead horizon from 1 to 4 time periods. Table 6 summarizes the 
averages of SS, total LOC and pricing problem CPU time, 
relative to the myopic counterparts. It can be observed that the 
dispatch-following incentives measured by LOC as well as 
economic efficiency reflected by SS grow as the number of the 
look-head period increases. The economic efficiency growth 
slows down after the look-ahead period reaches 2. In addition, 
although the CPU time of the pricing problem becomes longer 
with the longer look-ahead period, it is still computationally 
tractable for RT applications. No constraints are violated under 
all look-ahead time horizons, so the proposed approach is 
reliable. Notice that even when the proposed approach solves a 
single-period problem, it outperforms the myopic counterpart 
due to the fact that the proposed approach takes into 
consideration of the future schedules as well as intertemporal 
opportunity costs. 
 Number of look-ahead time periods 
 1 2 3 4 
SS  +1.3% +1.4% +1.4% +1.4% 
LOC  -88% -90% -93% -93% 
CPU time 
(seconds) 
1.9 3.8 6.3 7.6 
Table 6:  The averages of SS, LOC and pricing problem CPU time of the 
proposed approach relative to the myopic approach under different look-
ahead horizons. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a coordinated multi-period market clearing 
scheme is proposed for both scheduling and pricing of a power 
system constrained by intertemporal linkages. Compared to the 
state-of-the-art multi-period approaches, the proposed scheme 
is innovative for being the first considering the simultaneous 
pricing and scheduling coordination between a forward market 
and RTM. The tight coordination allows the proposed scheme 
to be able to improve computational efficiency, reliability, 
economic efficiency, and load-following incentives 
simultaneously whereas the existing methods have to make 
tradeoffs among these properties. Furthermore, the proposed 
models consider a general form, rather than being customized 
for a specific type of intertemporal constraints. These 
advantages make the proposed scheme practical, generic and 
flexible to be applied to a wide spectrum of market timeframes 
as well as to various resource types.  
Compared to the existing myopic method, the dispatch 
instructions generated by the proposed scheme are more 
economically efficient and reliable. The market clearing prices 
of the proposed scheme provide better dispatch-following 
incentives because the intertemporal opportunity cost is taken 
into consideration in the pricing problem. These advantages of 
the proposed multi-period scheme are demonstrated in 
numerical experiments.         
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